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1. Introduction 
1.1 The emergence of geoengineering as a policy option 
There has been a recent and rapid growth of interest within the scientific and policy 
community in exploring a range of techniques, collectively termed ‘geoengineering’(or 
alternatively ‘climate engineering’), for deliberatively intervening in the climate to counteract 
global warming (American Meteorological Society, 2009; Bipartisan Policy Centre Task 
Force, 2011; Royal Society, 2009; United States Government Accountability Office, 2011). 
Within the space of a few years, and with the endorsement of learned societies and 
governance institutions, geoengineering has been transformed from a topic discussed largely 
in science fiction and esoteric scientific papers into mainstream scientific and policy debate. 
One class of method of geoengineering, termed solar radiation management, has received 
particular attention. Solar radiation management techniques are intended to reflect some of 
the inbound sunlight back into space with the effect of reducing global warming. This 
contrasts with carbon dioxide removal techniques, which attempt to address the root cause of 
climate change by removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, and are seen by many as 
safer, but slower and more expensive. For the purposes of this paper we will focus on solar 
radiation management. 
There are a number of ways of explaining the rise of solar radiation management as an 
emergent policy discourse. First, the slow progress of international climate negotiations has 
led to concerns that current mitigation policies may not produce the necessary reductions in 
emissions that are necessary to avoid dangerous climate change. Second, proponents of the 
technology argue that solar radiation management could not only reduce global temperatures 
relatively quickly, perhaps within a few months of deployment, but also relatively cheaply, 
relative to the cost of implementing greenhouse gas emissions reductions (Boyd, 2008; 
Caldeira and Keith, 2010; SRMGI, 2011). Geoengineering is thus becoming seen as a third 
policy route for responding to climate change, alongside mitigation and adaptation (Nurse, 
2011).  
1.2 The debate about geoengineering governance 
The policy debate on geoengineering governance and regulation is in its infancy. There 
currently exist no international treaties that cover all geoengineering techniques, although it is 
widely assumed that most techniques could be covered by an extension of existing treaties 
(Royal Society, 2009; SRMGI, 2011). Nevertheless, there have been some early statements 
by policy bodies. In 2010, for example, the 193 member United Nations Convention on 
Biodiversity declared that there should be no field tests of geoengineering projects that might 
affect biodiversity (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010), while in October 2011 the 
European Parliament expressed ‘its opposition to proposals for large scale geo-engineering’ 
(Marshall, 2011). Such statements are not legally binding; but they nevertheless reflect early 
political unease with the prospect of geoengineering taking place without adequate regulatory 
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arrangements (see also Virgoe, 2009; Lempert and Prosnitz, 2011; Olson, 2011; SRMGI, 
2011).  
A number of initiatives have occurred in recent years, aimed at articulating the goals 
and possible form of geoengineering research governance. These include: (1) the 
establishment of the ‘Oxford Principles’ for the responsible conduct of geoengineering 
research, submitted and adopted by the UK House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee and subsequently approved by the Scientific Organising Committee at the 
Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies (Rayner et al., 
2010; Asilomar Scientific Organizing Committee, 2010); (2) the development of a 
framework for responsible innovation aimed at guiding assessment on whether the UK 
Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) research project’s proposed 
test-bed – the United Kingdom’s first field trial of solar radiation management technology – 
should be permitted (Macnaghten and Owen, 2011); and (3) the Solar Radiation Management 
Governance Initiative (SRMGI) – an international, NGO-driven initiative aimed at examining 
in depth the governance issues raised by research into solar radiation management methods 
(SRMGI, 2011).   
There is still considerable diversity of opinion about exactly what form geoengineering 
governance should take.  However, there seems to be an emerging consensus that it should 
involve a combination of soft law and hard law, be guided by principles such as ‘the public 
interest’ and transparency, and involve ‘upstream’ engagement with wider stakeholders and 
the public (Corner et al., 2012; Rayner et al., 2010; SRMGI, 2011).  It is also argued that 
governance during the research stage might be relatively ‘soft’ to permit or even encourage 
‘safe’, laboratory or small-scale research (with proposed governance mechanisms ranging 
through laissez-faire permissiveness, self-regulation, independent national policies, to an 
informal consortium of countries); however, most argue that governance would have to 
become ‘harder’ before any large-scale field research or deployment, probably through a 
multilateral, international body such as the United Nations (Virgoe, 2009; SRMGI, 2011). 
However, despite the growing sophistication of the debate around solar radiation 
management governance, a number of assumptions persist in the policy literature that require 
further scrutiny.  Firstly, it is assumed that debates around solar radiation management are 
debates about a unified, stable, technological object, about which different people might 
make different knowledge claims, or to which they might attach different values, rather than 
a more complex conversation in which the very nature of geoengineering is put into question. 
Secondly, it is assumed that it is in principle possible to make a clear distinction between 
research into, and deployment of, solar radiation management.  This assumption manifests in 
the beliefs that meaningful research into the feasibility of these techniques can be carried out 
before deployment, and that this research will help ensure that any future deployment would 
be less likely to involve major surprises.  
Thirdly, it is assumed that the development of solar radiation management is similar 
enough to earlier episodes of technoscientific innovation that future governance processes 
will be able to follow existing and emerging frameworks of technology assessment, such as 
those of responsible innovation, ‘upstream’ public engagement and real-time technology 
assessment (Barben et al., 2009; Corner et al., 2011; Corner et al., 2012; Macnaghten and 
Owen, 2011). Fourthly, it is assumed that new institutional arrangements for the proper 
regulation of geoengineering can in principle be built on existing international instruments 
used to regulate transboundary issues, and more generally can be accommodated within the 
structures of democratic national and international governance (see discussion in Virgoe, 
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2009). Fifthly, it is assumed that survey, qualitative and public engagement research can help 
clarify public attitudes to solar radiation management (see Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Leiserowitz et 
al., 2010; Mercer et al., 2011; Parkhill and Pidgeon, 2011; Pidgeon et al., 2012; Poumadere et 
al., 2011; Spence et al., 2010), and that the main role of such research should be to 
incorporate value-based considerations about geoengineering into decision-making (see 
Corner et al., 2012 for a review). Notwithstanding the importance of such research, what has 
been insufficiently explored is how public engagement methods can be used to explore the 
kinds of world that solar radiation management techniques might bring into being, and 
thereby to critically explore the assumptions that underpin governance debates around this 
technology. 
1.3 Solar Radiation Management geoengineering, the social sciences and the public 
In this section we argue that, as solar radiation management is becoming more clearly 
formed as a policy option, it is taking on a particular ‘social constitution’ – a distinctive set of 
implications about the sort of world that its deployment would likely bring into being (Grove-
White et al., 2000; see also Kearnes et al., 2006, p. 301).  This social constitution renders 
problematic the assumptions listed above, and thereby will make solar radiation management 
particularly difficult to accommodate within conventional understandings of governance. 
Building on existing public engagement research on geoengineering we go on to articulate a 
more critical role that the social sciences should be playing in public engagement with solar 
radiation management.  
First, unlike many technoscientific issues, the distinctiveness of solar radiation 
management does not lie in the use of novel technologies with new properties: the actual 
interventions themselves typically involve mundane technologies such as mirrors, iron dust, 
sulphate particles or crumbled rock, albeit deployed at a very large scale.  Its novelty rather 
lies in the intention to use these technologies to establish a radically new relationship 
between society and nature, through a project of bringing planetary systems under human 
control and the ‘making’ of new climates (Galarraga and Szerszynski, 2012; see also Corner 
et al., 2012;  Hulme 2012; Ipsos-MORI, 2010). 
Second, even though existing research has highlighted public concerns over the 
unintended consequences of solar radiation management (Corner and Pidgeon 2010; Pidgeon 
et al., 2012), we go further to suggest that solar radiation management has a distinctive and 
constitutive relationship with uncertainty. With most technologies, it is the side-effects that 
are likely to be hard to predict and difficult to attribute, because of the way that they often 
depend on stochastic processes.  It is this feature of many contemporary technologies which 
led Ulrich Beck to suggest that we now live in a ‘risk society’ (1992), one pervaded by 
unwanted and probabilistic side-effects of modernisation. But with solar radiation 
management techniques, because even the intended effects are probabilistic – since their goal 
is to affect statistical constructs such as ‘global average temperature’ through intervening into 
an earth system which is highly chaotic and in a constant process of formation – uncertainty 
becomes even more unavoidable.  
Third, the way that solar radiation management is constituted as a global technology of 
planetary management further alters the more usual spatial relationship between the ‘effects’ 
and ‘side-effects’ of a technology.  It is more usual for technologies to be designed to bring 
about a local effect, but later to be found to have very different distant and often long-term 
side-effects, which then have to be managed and minimised through international treaties and 
protocols (EEA, 2002). With solar radiation management, however, this relationship is more 
or less reversed: it is the intended effects (for example, a reduction in average global 
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temperature) that are global, that may only occur over long timescales, and that will depend 
on tightly coordinated action.  The binding together of the fate of different nations will thus 
follow a very different logic to that of earlier issues such as acid rain and ozone depletion, 
and will be more complete: in the case of geoengineering, international agreement will not 
just be necessary to control any transboundary side-effects of any specific interventions; it 
will be involved in constituting the very technology from the outset.   
Fourth, governing solar radiation management will involve engaging to an unusual 
degree with the issue of intent (Corner and Pidgeon, 2010; Stilgoe, 2011). Intention is 
particularly integral to the very definition of geoengineering, as a research and engineering 
project with a particular purpose – to offset anthropogenic climate change.  Thus, whether or 
not a specific action such as releasing particles into the upper atmosphere counts as solar 
radiation management, as research, or as mere pollution cannot be determined by an objective 
test: the governance of geoengineering logically requires the scrutiny and regulation of the 
aims and intentions, both explicit and implicit, not just of real-world deployment but also of 
purported research activity. The interpretive flexibility of intent in solar radiation 
management research means that it would be likely to create even greater governance 
challenges than the issue of nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, if the objectives towards 
which the technology is employed were to alter, then its very nature would have thereby 
changed – rendering problematic claims of legality or prior democratic consent.  
Solar radiation management is perhaps not unique in possessing any one of these 
characteristics.  But cumulatively they suggest that debate around these techniques should 
proceed in a way that recognises that it is by no means a straightforward object of governance. 
Table 1 summarises the five assumptions that underpin current policy debates on 
geoengineering governance outlined in Section 1.2 and how each of them may be 
reconfigured through critical social science inquiry. 
 
Table 1.  Current debates on solar radiation management governance and their critique 
Mediating factor 
Assumptions within debates on 
solar radiation management 
governance 
A critical approach to solar 
radiation management 
governance 
Status of geoengineering Solar radiation management is a 
unified, stable technological object 
with clear intent that can be judged 
against other policy options for 
dealing with climate change 
Solar radiation management is a 
political project with unstable intent 
whose novelty lies in using 
mundane technologies to bring 
planetary systems under human 
control 
Approach to research 
 
The function of research is that of 
ironing out uncertainties and 
understanding side-effects prior to 
deployment 
The effects of solar radiation 
management will inevitably be at 
best probabilistic meaning that 
deployment will have the 
unavoidable character of research 
Approach to governance 
 
Governance processes can be 
developed out of previous cases on 
scientific governance 
Solar radiation management may 
create novel socio-political effects 
because of its distinctive spatio-
temporal logic  
Approach to politics 
 
Solar radiation management 
governance can be accommodated 
within existing forms of democratic 
governance 
Solar radiation management 
governance may raise significant 
challenges for democratic 
governance 
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Approach to public 
engagement  
The role of public engagement is to 
incorporate public views and values 
into governance arrangements 
The role of public engagement is to 
help understand the sort of world(s) 
that solar radiation management 
deployment might bring into being 
 
 
One implication of this suggested critical reconfiguration for the conduct of social 
science research is the need to be particularly attentive to the process of issue and identity 
formation in public engagement exercises (on this issue see Chilvers, 2010; Irwin, 2006; 
Lezaun and Soneryd, 2007; Stirling, 2008; Wynne, 2006). It is important that public 
engagement exercises do not pre-define the issue in line with existing framings or obscure 
their role as sites at which both issues and publics are simultaneously shaped and articulated 
(Felt and Fochler, 2010; see also Jasanoff, 2004; Felt and Wynne, 2007; Marres, 2007). This 
presents a considerable set of challenges and responsibilities for the social sciences in respect 
to the public: methodologically, to be able to develop robust methods able to elicit public 
responses in ways that do not simply reproduce dominant framings; conceptually, to be able 
to understand public responses and the factors that shape them; politically, to be able to 
interpret public responses and their implications for geoengineering governance. The ability 
to explore future worlds is perhaps the greatest challenge for deliberation on solar radiation 
management (on this issue, see Callon et al., 2009). In order to further develop public 
engagement research in this area (for a review of the state of the art, see Corner et al., 2012), 
it will be necessary to develop techniques and skills to imagine the composition of a 
geoengineered future that might be brought into being through solar radiation management– 
its phenomenology, its political economy, its lifeworld. This requires participants being 
facilitated to deliberate on the dominant imaginaries of key actors – scientists, policy-makers, 
civil society actors – and to imagine how the future will unfold with respect to those 
imaginaries under real-world conditions (see Macnaghten, 2010, for an elaboration of this 
argument with respect to nanotechnology).  
 
2. Methods 
Taking the above arguments into account a deliberative focus group methodology was 
developed to meet the following criteria: (1) in the absence of a public debate, to design 
stimulus materials to offer participants a range of rhetorical resources without closing down 
or narrowing the issue in the first place (Felt et al., 2012; Stirling, 2008; Sciencewise-ERC, 
2010); (2) to ensure the discussion was not framed by experts, through the decision not to 
include a technical geoengineering expert in the discussions (as previous research has 
indicated that the presence of experts can induce deference to prior framings amongst lay 
participants; see Wynne, 2006); (3) to moderate the discussions to ensure a diversity of voice, 
independent of background or experience, in line with agreed norms of focus group 
moderation (Barbour, 2008; Barbour and Kitzinger, 1999); (4) to require participants not 
necessarily to arrive at a common output or consensus, but nevertheless to articulate shared 
issue definitions, when present (Callon et al., 2009); (5) to model research on recent 
deliberative research and guidance on ‘upstream’ public engagement (Davies et al., 2009; 
Pidgeon et al., 2012; Wilsdon and Willis, 2004); and (6) to employ techniques that will 
support participants in the process of imagining the kinds of world that solar radiation 
management might bring into being, in order to test the plausibility of the assumptions 
underpinning governance debates. 
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The focus groups were moderated by the authors, both experienced focus group 
practitioners. Seven focus groups were carried out in three UK cities (Durham, Newcastle 
and London) in December 2011, each with eight participants and lasting three hours. The 
sampling specification was theoretically derived: designed to cover a diverse variety of 
backgrounds and demographics (age, gender, socio-economic class) but with topic-specific 
variants. Three of the groups were selected due to their having a practical interest in the 
climate: a group of keen gardeners (focus group 7, all women, aged 40–60, socio-economic 
class B/C1/C2), a group of outdoor manual workers (focus group 6, all men, aged 25–35, 
socio-economic class C2/D) and a group of outdoor enthusiasts (focus group 1, both men and 
women, aged 30–50, socio-economic class B/C1). The four other groups were chosen to have 
a particular lifeworld orientation that might shape their general attitude to geoengineering in 
different ways: a group of engineers and managers (focus group 5, all men, aged 30–50, 
socio-economic class B/C1), a group of mothers of young children involved with their local 
community (focus group 2, all women, aged 25–40, socio-economic class B/C1), a group of 
professional men working in the public sector and with an interest in current affairs (focus 
group 3, all men, aged 40-60, socio-economic class A/B) and a group of individuals signed 
up to participate in a citizens’ panel on living with environmental change (focus group 4, 
both men and women, socio-economic class B/ C1/ C2/ D). The rationale for the selection 
criteria was to explore whether shared lifeworld experiences would structure responses to 
geoengineering: for example, would the engineers be more favourably disposed to a 
‘technical fix’ for climate change; would the public sector professionals engage collectively 
with the politics; would the mothers be sensitised to the kind of future that solar radiation 
management would bring into being. The decision to bring participants together on the basis 
of shared experience was to foster a favourable setting for the collective discussion of an 
unfamiliar topic (see Macnaghten and Myers, 2004; Morgan, 1988). Recruitment was topic-
blind: participants were recruited to take part in a discussion on ‘global issues’, and 
geoengineering was only introduced 70 minutes into the discussion. Participants were 
recruited by professional recruiters. 
The materials were developed by the authors and externally reviewed by three 
colleagues, all experts in public deliberation and technological governance. The materials 
were presented on large A1 boards, consisted of pictures and text (all attributed) and 
presented to the group to stimulate conversation. The focus groups began with an open-ended 
discussion on experience of the weather and the climate, designed to provide a context for 
future deliberations on geoengineering as a climate change modification technology. This 
was followed by a discussion on climate change and policy responses. A concept board was 
used with material from International Panel on Climate Change reports and using direct 
quotes from newspapers and non-governmental organisation campaigns to highlight current 
debates on targets and the slow progress of climate negotiations. The purpose of this section 
of conversation was to provide a framing that was relatively open to geoengineering as a 
policy option; one that is reflective of the current dominant policy discourse (see Bipartisan 
Policy Centre Task Force, 2011; Royal Society, 2009). Subsequently, the concept of 
geoengineering was introduced: both as a set of techniques, with specific reference to Solar 
Radiation Management and Carbon Dioxide Reduction methods, and as a policy response to 
anthropogenic climate change. Again, the intent was to use the framing from within the 
establishment science-policy community. After an exploration of views on geoengineering in 
general and solar radiation management in particular, we then introduced how environmental 
and civil society actors were thinking about solar radiation management, designed to explore 
public views and perspectives on civil society and oppositional perspectives. This was 
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followed by an engagement with a different kind of frame, setting out the geopolitical history 
of weather and climate modification (see Fleming, 2010). This was designed to explore the 
salience of alternative frames surrounding the possible use of solar radiation management 
techniques for other social, political and military purposes. Finally, we discussed the 
implications of solar radiation management for society and politics: what kind of people we 
would become, what kind of politics would be required, and what messages the participants 
had for science, politics and policy-makers.  
 
3. Findings: An Analysis of Public Discourse 
3.1 Conditional acceptance 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the public responses to solar radiation management that we 
elicited were complex, multi-faceted, difficult to interpret and rich in content. However, 
notwithstanding the complexity of the topic, across all the groups, participants were able to 
learn about the issues, to consider and reflect on them, to become engaged, hear different 
perspectives, change their minds, develop their points of view and co-evolve a set of 
consistent scenarios of life in a geoengineered world. Despite notable differences between the 
focus groups, what emerged most clearly was the similar themes that emerged across the 
focus groups and the pathways through which these developed as the discussions progressed. 
It is the analysis of these common themes that we focus on in this paper.  
The early stages of deliberation was characterised by a complexity of positions. For 
some, solar radiation management should be opposed completely; for others, it was an option 
to be explored. Below is an extract from one of the engineers expressing his initial support 
for solar radiation management: 
 
Michael: I think the main principle is “let’s do something”.  We’re all doing some elements of recycling.  
Companies aren’t particularly signing up to any hard and fast issues of penalties to punish or 
anything like that.  If this could buy 20-25 years or whatever, when we stem the growth in 
terms of temperature increase.  So why wouldn’t you that?  Let’s do something. 
 (Focus Group 5: Engineers) 
 
Michael is here extolling the principle of doing something rather than simply waiting 
for nature to take its course. This was a discourse that was popular with the engineers and 
technicians who made up Focus Group 5, and who appeared to be more accepting, 
philosophically, of the idea of using technology to deliberatively intervene in the Earth’s 
climate system. The idea of solar radiation management ‘buying time’ is a discourse common 
amongst geoengineering researchers in arguments promoting the need for research (see 
Caldeira and Keith, 2010; Keith et al., 2010).  
Michael could be described as a ‘supporter’ of solar radiation management using a 
typology used by Mercer et al. (2011) in segmenting attitudinal groups. However, this would 
be to misunderstand his response. Rather, he is deploying the discourse of ‘conditional 
acceptance’ (see also Bickerstaff et al., 2008). Michael is not advocating acceptance of solar 
radiation management in a straightforward sense, but only reluctantly, and only if certain 
conditions are met: in this case, to buy time. Later in the discussion, when participants were 
exposed to other framings of the technology, Michael (and others who had adopted similar 
  
7 
early support for the technology) had developed a clearer and more developed articulation of 
the conditions attached.  
A more comprehensive thematic analysis of the focus group transcripts allowed us to 
identify five conditions as particularly salient in the discussions. While these are neither 
exhaustive nor exclusive, they were clearly critical in modulating the respondents’ views on 
the acceptability of solar radiation management. These were: 
 
1. Confidence in climate science as a reliable guide to policy and action (Condition of 
scientific robustness);  
2. Confidence in the ability of research to anticipate the side-effects of solar radiation 
management (Condition of research foreseeability); 
3. Confidence in the ability of research to demonstrate the efficacy of solar radiation 
management  (Condition of research efficacy); 
4. Confidence in the political organisation and effective governance of solar radiation 
management (Condition of effective governance); 
5. Confidence in the capacity of existing political systems to accommodate solar 
radiation management (Condition of democracy). 
 
3.2 Conditions under scrutiny 
The approach that we adopted builds on a model developed by Cynthia Selin (2011) in 
which she subjects future visions of a technology – in her case nanotechnology – to public 
scrutiny using the criterion of plausibility. This technique is used as a means of deliberating 
the social implications of an emergent technology where outcomes are as yet unknown. Only 
if such visions are seen as plausible by wider actors will they contribute to reasonable public 
policy. This technique is presented as having the potential to build reflexivity into policy 
deliberation and enable anticipatory governance and responsible innovation (see also Barben 
et al., 2008; Owen et al., 2012). In our research we subjected the above conditions – which 
were embedded in scientific and policy debates on solar radiation management as outlined in 
Section 1.2 and Section 1.3 – to public scrutiny and deliberation. We examine how realistic, 
tenable, feasible, likely, probable, believable the conditions were perceived to be under real 
world contingencies.  
3.2.1 Condition 1: Confidence in climate science as a reliable guide to policy 
Arguably, the foundational condition required for any form of solar radiation 
management proposal is that people have confidence in the science of climate change as a 
reliable basis for policy (Condition 1). Only if people believe in the ability and authority of 
climate science to predict with confidence, and progressively greater certainty, the reality and 
consequences of climate change, can policies aimed at climate remediation gain traction 
(Sarewitz, 2010). Amongst our participants this level of confidence was rarely held. Even 
though the clear majority of participants shared the view that polluting activities were 
impacting on the climate, there was much less confidence in official accounts of expert 
scientific opinion as providing authoritative evidence of precise linkages between greenhouse 
gas emissions and degrees of warming of the climate system. In the extract below, Andrew is 
expressing the idea that nature may operate according to processes and cycles that are barely 
comprehended by contemporary science: 
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Andrew: I think it’s not an exact science, you can’t say… the last three years the temperature’s gone 
up one degree, but I think in context it’s only a small blip of the total world cycle, and I 
think personally a lot of it is the hype in the media and people are being misled into saying 
it’s global warming, and all the rest of it.  And me being naturally cynical, I think it’s part of 
the way that the government are getting more money out of you in green taxes from the 
public, getting them to pay more.  And I think it’s a big con personally, because I don’t think 
anybody can say for certain even if it is getting warmer [if] it’s down to carbon emissions.  I 
think it’s life’s natural cycle.. 
 (Focus Group 1: Outdoor Enthusiasts) 
In this extract Andrew is articulating the view that the science of climate change may 
be less certain than is commonly accredited, and that climate policy, in addition, may be 
tainted by the impure motives of the media and/or governments. Variants on this discourse 
were commonplace across the focus groups, and were the source of considerable debate and 
discussion.  This kind of response complements survey findings that suggest that, despite low 
absolute levels of public scepticism about the concept of anthropogenic climate change in the 
UK (Poortinga et al., 2011), public scepticism about climate science is growing in the UK as 
well as the USA (BBC, 2010; Leiserowitz et al., 2010; Pew Research Centre, 2009; Pidgeon 
and Fischhoff, 2011). Interestingly, these extracts of conversation took place prior to 
discussion of geoengineering but prefigured doubts later expressed over the efficacy of solar 
radiation management proposals. People felt that, if climate scientists and policymakers are 
over-estimating their understanding of the complex and apparently chaotic earth–ocean–
atmosphere system, solar radiation management proposals may unwittingly introduce 
perturbations into that system in unpredictable and potentially dangerous ways.  
3.2.2 Condition 2: Confidence in the ability of research to predict side-effects  
Earlier, we argued that policy discussions tends to assume that the uncertainties 
associated with geoengineering deployment can in principle be minimized and managed in 
advance by research. Such a belief is necessary if solar radiation management is to be seen as 
having the potential to ‘restore’ or ‘remediate’ the climate, a discursive frame commonly 
adopted by scientific and science policy communities (see, for example, Bipartisan Policy 
Centre Task Force, 2011). The second condition concerns the plausibility of this claim: 
whether research is perceived to have the ability to predict (and manage) the side-effects of 
solar radiation management in advance of full deployment, and thus restore the climate to a 
previous state. Without accurate foresight – and control measures – solar radiation 
management could bring in its wake nasty surprises.  
For most participants, there was little belief in the capacity of science to identify 
possible side-effects in advance. For most, solar radiation management was seen as ‘messing 
with nature’ and, as a consequence, as inevitably creating unpredictable and potentially 
dangerous shocks and surprises, especially if current understandings and predictions of 
climate changes proved to be ill-founded. Nearly all participants agreed that such techniques 
would unwittingly produce side-effects not anticipated in advance by science. This 
‘unforeseen effects’ discourse was commonplace in all discussions. For some, these 
unforeseen effects were seen as likely to arise as a consequence of nature ‘fighting back’. The 
model of nature was one of an active agent – for some a wild beast (see also Pearce, 2007) – 
who would not placidly accept such intrusive interventions in an accommodating manner. 
The idea of solar radiation management ‘restoring’ or ‘remediating’ the climate was by and 
large rejected. Across the groups we found recurrent themes: that it is impossible to predict 
how solar radiation management will impact on the Earth’s climate system; that unforeseen 
and dangerous effects are not simply possible but probable given the scale of the proposed 
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interventions; that such effects will take decades or longer to materialise; and that solar 
radiation management is likely to be more dangerous than what it is trying to prevent. Given 
the uncertainties involved, and the probable and potentially dangerous side-effects associated, 
the inevitable consequence is that we will be ‘living the experiment’. We will, in effect, be 
‘guinea pigs’. Since science will not have the capacity to provide answers in advance, this 
pervasive experimentality will be part of the new human condition: 
Kaitlyn: The thing that scares me is that the experiment will be done in our [life times]... 
Natalie: It’s such a huge thing, though, isn’t it? 
Kaitlyn: Yeah.  The experiment will be while we’re here... and ... for our children.  What if the 
experiment goes wrong?  Then what happens? 
Lillian: Do you think it could destroy the Earth? 
Kaitlyn: Yeah, it could go the other way.  How can you test...?  Can it be tested in a laboratory?  But 
then it’s got to go out there.   
Mod: Yeah, sure.  So that’s the big question for you.  We’ll be living the experiment, in a sense.  Is 
that what you’re saying? 
Kaitlyn: Yeah. 
Natalie: We’re the lab rats. 
 (Focus Group 2: Mothers) 
 
3.2.3 Condition 3: Confidence in the ability of research to demonstrate efficacy  
A further assumption embedded in policy discourse is that research is able to 
demonstrate the efficacy of solar radiation management proposals. Only if research is able to 
demonstrate in plausible ways that solar radiation management is likely to be effective in 
practical and operational terms will moves to deployment be seen as credible. In the group 
discussions there was widespread discussion on the technicalities of proposed solutions. 
Considerable time was devoted to exploring questions surrounding one particular 
geoengineering research project – the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate 
Engineering (SPICE) project – and its proposal to test the design of a stratospheric aerosol 
delivery system using a tethered balloon and pipe in what would have been the UK’s first 
field trial of solar radiation management technology (Macnaghten and Owen, 2011). 
Particularly amongst the more technically minded participants (Groups 1, 4 & 5), 
considerable doubt was raised as to whether such a scheme would be technically feasible, and 
whether the proposed 1:20 scale test-bed spraying water would provide useful and relevant 
information for full deployment scenarios (see Parkhill and Pidgeon, 2011 for a more 
extensive analysis of a public deliberation exercise on the SPICE project). The extract below 
illustrates how the engineers responded to the SPICE project: 
 
Michael: The point that I think you guys made is that, you know, one kilometre versus 20 kilometres. 
Is that really gonna - is it a true representative of the view of the technology. You know, is it 
literally gonna be - is it pointless following it because the leap between 1k and 20k is so 
huge. 
Daniel: It’s massive. 
Adrian: It’s phenomenal, isn’t it. 
Michael: It requires completely new different type of technology, greater pumping facilities, etcetera. 
So actually you’re not really trialling anything by that … 
 (Focus Group 5: Engineers) 
 
There was similar scepticism about the possibility of ascertaining how much, of what, 
needs to be injected into the atmosphere to effectively and safely manage the climate system. 
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For our participants, it was implausible to imagine that the effects of particulate injection 
could be known except in the context of full deployment, at a planetary level and across 
considerable timescales. The scale of planetary intervention is the subject of the extract 
below: 
Robert: You can’t experiment with this.  Like a lot of projects I work on you do tests and modelling 
and mock-ups but you can’t test this.  Test it on the planet? 
 (Focus Group 3: Public Sector Professionals) 
This deliberation led some participants to question their support for solar radiation 
management research at all. While there was initial acceptance of the need for research in 
principle, following deliberation there was more general reticence for a number of reasons: 
that research would be predominantly based on models, that proposed field trial experiments 
looked technically unfeasible and unlikely to produce any knowledge of substance, that 
researchers would be pressurised to tell only positive results, and that the planetary scale at 
which deployment was imagined was such that research only makes sense at that level. 
3.2.4 Condition 4: Confidence in the effective governance of solar radiation management  
In Section 1.3 we argued that the governance challenges raised by geoengineering will 
involve engaging with the issue of ‘intent’, given that the technology is defined by its 
intention of counteracting climate change by technological intervention. To have confidence 
in the effective governance of solar radiation management proposals (Condition 4) will 
require endorsement on two levels: acceptance of the concept of solar radiation management 
as a set of techniques and policy options that complement those of mitigation and adaptation 
(the ‘Plan B’ argument); and confidence that these techniques will be used primarily and 
exclusively by governments and other actors for the said purposes of counteracting 
anthropogenic climate change. To what extent was the effective governance condition seen as 
plausible? 
By and large solar radiation management philosophically was regarded as treating the 
symptoms rather than the underlying causes of global warming. Participants were told that it 
was presented by policymakers as a way of ‘buying time’ for climate mitigation policies to 
take effect; but it was nevertheless seen by most as a ‘techno-fix’ for a problem that was 
political, commercial and perhaps even moral in origin. Even though solar radiation 
management may be presented in good faith as ‘Plan B’ (‘Plan A’ being continued effort at 
climate mitigation), there was a shared concern across the groups that its very availability as 
an technological option would weaken the commitment to climate mitigation – the well-
known ‘moral hazard’ argument, that today’s ‘Plan B’ would become tomorrow’s ‘Plan A’.  
However, just as the pursuit of solar radiation management techniques could reduce the 
political impetus for international climate negotiations and emissions policy, so too might 
geopolitical considerations impact on how and where the technology gets pursued and for 
what ends. In the focus group discussions we raised explicitly the question of whether the 
good intentions of solar radiation management could be assured, thus scrutinising further the 
plausibility of Condition 4. By and large the answer was ‘no’. Not only would the technology 
become politicised, according to our participants, but it would do so for national and regional 
advantage, in ways that may be radically at odds with its intended purpose of counteracting 
anthropogenic climate change. Interestingly, these discussions took place after the 
presentation of a concept board, setting out the history of earlier attempts at weather and 
climate modification, including for military and geopolitical purposes, and after an exercise 
in which people imagined how life would be changed by solar radiation management. Below 
is one typical contribution: 
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Andrew: What’s to do stop this being proven technology and the Chinese say “Well okay, we need to 
do something to help China”?  They introduce something like that which then makes it ten 
degrees colder in the north-east of England.  Do you really think the Chinese are going to be 
bothered about us in Newcastle?  And that’s my fear: that greed and all the corporate type of 
greed that goes on could affect people in the world. 
 (Focus Group 1: Outdoor Enthusiasts) 
 
3.2.5 Condition 5: Confidence in the capacity of democracy to accommodate solar radiation 
management  
The fifth and final condition concerns public confidence in the capacity of existing 
political systems to accommodate solar radiation management. To what extent was this 
condition seen as plausible? Difficulties associated with this condition related to a number of 
characteristics of solar radiation management that we outlined in section 1.3: its distinctively 
global character, its inherent uncertainty, and its ‘social constitution’ as a political project of 
planetary control. The concern expressed by participants across a number of groups was that 
planetary governance would be intensely difficult to achieve within current political 
arrangements. Current omens were poor: given the lack of progress to achieve global 
consensus on to the mitigation of climate change, what chance would there be to achieve a 
consensual politics and set of agreements on solar radiation management proposals?  
 
Robert: Well … if we can’t agree on a global level for emissions or other targets how can we 
possibly agree on a global level to invest in these types of projects? … To get a global 
agreement on these types of projects and investment levels, as you were saying … good luck 
to them. 
Nicholas: Well I don’t see, one, how you get America involved when it doesn’t admit there’s climate 
change anyway.  So you’ve got that problem.  The ones that do admit can’t do anything 
about it because their economies are growing, they can’t afford it.  That’s the three biggest 
economies in the world and to put it politely you’re stuffed. 
Martin: …  We can’t even agree what’s going on in Brussels, they can’t agree with us.  Then we’re 
suddenly talking about geoengineering and creating false atmospheres to change the climate. 
 (Focus Group 3: Public Sector Professionals) 
 
This extract is from the Public Sector Professionals group. All recruited on account of 
their interest in politics and current affairs, this group relished the opportunity to explore just 
how complex – and unrealistic – it would be to achieve the kinds of global agreements that 
would be required for nations to sign up to solar radiation management deployment. 
Interestingly, when asked what kind of citizens we would need to become to accommodate 
solar radiation management the response from a member of this group was “gullible” ones. 
The theme of the technology being unable to be accommodated within a democratic politics 
was shared by other groups, including the Citizens Panel (focus group 4) who offered the 
view that solar radiation management could only work in conditions of a ‘benign 
dictatorship’. Other groups suggested that the dictatorship would be less benign, not least 
because solar radiation management would necessarily be carried out on a planetary basis 
with no accommodation for dissent or ‘opt out’. Thus, in the outdoor workers’ group (focus 
group 6), participants argued that the technology would inevitably lead to conflict, arguing in 
colourful language that “You’ve just got to pray that some nutter don’t get in charge of it”. 
The difficulty was seen as further compounded given that the effects of solar radiation 
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management deployment would only be known after a significant time period and then would 
be subject to contestation. 
  
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
4.1 Contributions to existing literatures  
This study generated many findings which were broadly consistent with the existing 
literature on public attitudes to solar radiation management. These included: general concern 
about the uncertainties involved, concern about unintended effects and about the 
‘unnaturalness’ of solar radiation management techniques, concern that the technology 
constituted a short-term fix rather than a genuine solution to climate change, and at best 
reluctant or conditional acceptance of the technology (Corner et al., 2012; Ipsos-MORI, 
2010; Mercer at al., 2011; Parkhill and Pidgeon, 2011; Pidgeon et al., 2012). However, in 
some important ways, our findings extend existing analyses. 
Firstly, unlike Mercer et al. (2011) we did not find clearly opposing ranks of supporters 
and detractors. Although some respondents from some of the groups would have identified 
themselves as conditional supporters at the start of the discussions – predominantly some 
from Group 1 (outdoor enthusiasts), Group 4 (Citizens’ Panel) and Group 5 (engineers) – as 
the groups went on to collectively deliberate about whether the conditions under which they 
would find solar radiation management acceptable could be realised in practice, these 
respondents by and large came to adopt far more sceptical and circumspect positions. Our 
analysis identified five different conditions which modulated discussion – some linked, 
others quite distinct – which provided a backdrop to questions of public acceptability. 
Deliberation on the plausibility of these conditions provided the participants with repertoires 
that they mobilised and deployed as resources for deliberation. As they did so, even 
participants who had started from a position of conditional acceptance came to see the 
conditions for successful, acceptable deployment as unfeasible and implausible, and thus 
became more sceptical.   
Of course, the relationship between conditionality and acceptance is, at least in part, 
contingent on unfolding events. Real-world developments, such as growing climate 
sensitivity, new evidence of climate-related damage or the further break-down of climate 
negotiations, may plausibly create dynamics in which people soften their opposition to solar 
radiation management. However, alternatively, as the potential political and social 
implications become clearer and better articulated, opposition may harden. Either way, what 
this analysis suggests is for the need for policy-makers to take into account the conditions 
attached to publicly-acceptable solar radiation management, as an integral element of 
decision-making processes. 
Secondly, even though the conditionality of public acceptability of solar radiation 
management has been noted by Corner et al. (2012), our analysis constitutes the first attempt 
to systematically set out what these conditions are and the implausibility of them being 
realised under real-world circumstances. This analysis thus helps explain one survey finding: 
that the more people know about the technology, the more sceptical they appear to become 
(Corner et al., 2012; Spence et al., 2010). Thirdly, our analysis extends understanding of the 
conditions themselves. Thus, whereas existing analyses have highlighted the issue of 
unintended consequences and side-effects (Betz, 2012; Corner and Pidgeon, 2010; Pidgeon et 
al., 2012; Vaughan and Lenton, 2011), our research has extended this analysis to highlight 
how solar radiation management has the potential to propagate a new condition of global 
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experimentality. Whereas existing analyses have highlighted the problem of achieving 
consent in governance arrangements (Corner and Pidgeon, 2010; Svoboda et al., 2011), our 
research has questioned whether solar radiation management can be accommodated within 
democratic institutions given its centralising and autocratic ‘social constitution’ (see also 
Grove-White et al., 2000). Whereas existing analyses have found ‘cautious and qualified 
support for well-regulated and limited research’ into solar radiation management (Corner et 
al., 2012, 458; see also Parkhill and Pidgeon, 2011), our research has found evidence of 
scepticism even of limited research, given that the effects were perceived by some to be 
knowable only in the context of full deployment. 
Overall, the participants in this study seemed to arrive at more consistently sceptical 
positions about the prospect of geoengineering than have been reported in earlier research.  
We can only speculate why this may be the case. In contrast to survey methods, the 
deliberative method gave participants a collective opportunity to explore the issue, to think 
through its implications more fully, and to arrive at what are arguably more considered 
positions.  The contrast with the findings of other deliberative research is perhaps more 
interesting.  The authors were careful to introduce the topic of geoengineering within the 
conventional frame of the perceived need to buy more time for greenhouse gas mitigation 
policies to become effective, in line with other deliberative exercises (see Ipsos-MORI, 2010; 
Parkhill and Pidgeon, 2011).  But other possible framings of geoengineering were also 
introduced later on, facilitating a discussion on the difficulty of policing ‘intent’.  The 
specific combination of deliberative methods used also included a phenomenological focus 
on getting the participants to imagine what it would be like to live in a world shaped by solar 
radiation management – technically, politically, socially and personally.  This combination of 
factors, we feel, created the conditions for a richer representation of the kind of public 
dynamics likely to unfold when a wider discussion of geoengineering ensues. Whether our 
framing strategy is more substantive and possibly more realistic is a matter of debate: some 
may argue that it may have unduly shaped subsequent public responses. Our response is that 
these additional frames were necessary to help ‘open up’ policy deliberation given their 
potential to reconfigure governance debates as geoengineering evolves as an issue (on the 
importance of framing in public engagement activities, see Jasanoff, 2004; Stirling 2008). 
 
4.2 Implications for policy and politics 
To conclude, we offer three provocative thoughts for policy deliberation and on the 
need for explicit discussion on whether solar radiation management can be accommodated 
within democratic governance. The Oxford Principles on geoengineering research state that 
‘geoengineering must be regulated as a public good’ and that there should be ‘public 
participation in geoengineering decision-making’ (Rayner et al., 2010).  In our research we 
question whether such goals are attainable. Democracy, in its various forms, depends on the 
articulation, negotiation and accommodation of plural views and interests. It relies on an 
evolving and partially flexible relationship between citizens and governance institutions. 
solar radiation management by contrast exists as a planetary technology. While plausibly able 
to accommodate diverse views into the formulation of its use, once deployed, there remains 
little opportunity for opt-out or for the accommodation of diverse perspectives. By its social 
constitution it appears inimical to the accommodation of difference. Following deployment it 
could only be controlled centrally and on a planetary scale. For these reasons, one important 
role of bringing publics into the democratic governance of solar radiation management may 
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be, ironically, as a method of articulating the anti-democratic constitution of the technology 
and its incompatibility with liberal democracy. 
Secondly, the effects of solar radiation management can only be known with certainty 
through deployment and across substantial timescales (of at least decades). Anticipating the 
efficacy and side-effects of the technology depend on modelling and simulations. The stakes 
involved – including legal, political and human dangers associated with the technology not 
running to plan – means that in effect we will be living the global social experiment. 
Deciding how to enter into this experiment, and on whose terms, raises questions for global 
governance of a novel kind. This also implies responsibilities for science of a character that is 
perhaps unprecedented. 
Thirdly, there remains the problem of governing solar radiation management and of 
ensuring that the technology is deployed for good purposes –  for example, to combat global 
warming rather than for national or regional advantage. Our participants regarded this 
prospect as highly implausible. Whether their judgement turns out to be justified, only time 
will tell, though it is quite possible that our participants are being more realistic than policy 
actors. What is does suggest however, is the potential for the technology to generate new 
forms of conflict and to reconfigure geopolitics. Anticipating the pathways and scenarios that 
this may take is a further challenge for solar radiation management governance. 
How to bring into democracy these issues – the potential for solar radiation 
management to negate democracy; the challenges of bringing publics and democratic 
processes into the decision of initiating a global social experiment; and the anticipation of 
dynamics of geopolitical conflict that may ensue – remains key questions that will have to be 
addressed in advance of any discussions of solar radiation management deployment. Therein 
lies a set of formidable challenges for the social sciences. 
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